Industrial economic aspects of Belgian price regulation.

Regulation;

Innovation by leaders without winner-take-all.

In innovative races with winner takes all, leading firms invest less than each follower, given exogenous entry (Reinganum, 1985). But with endogenous entry this result is reversed (Etro, 2004). It is argued here that sharing of rewards between the players may alter these predictions.Firms; Free entry; Innovation; IT; Market sharing; Patent race; Prediction; Predictions;

Industrial organization and the economics of business strategy.

Industrial organization (IO) has an important role to play in inspiring the competition and regulation policies of the government. At the same it can be used to clarify the economics of business strategies. The idea here is not to give a comprehensive review, but to draw attention to some striking tendencies, prospects and problems of the field of IO as a source of inspiration for competitive strategies. A first focus will be on credible market strategies and asymmetric information, with implications for internal organization, vertical foreclosure and markets with switching costs. A second point will look at detection of not so obvious possibilities, as there are lower prices with cooperation, disadvantageous mergers, positive side effects for rivals, and disadvantageous price discrimination. Finally some approaches will be discussed to problems concerning high requirements on rationality and lack of robustness. An example will be discussed of a search for robustness in strategic investment models in oligopoly settings with leaders and followers.Economics; Strategy;

Leader, follower. Strategic investments with asymmetric spillovers.

This paper analyzes the strategic incentives of ¯rst and second movers in sequential invest- ment games with Stackelberg competition and price leadership on the output market. The study shows that the follower can invest more than the leader when the outgoing spillover from the leader to the follower is su±ciently high, taking into account the outgoing spillover of the follower. This result tends to apply in quantity and price settings. It is also shown that when externalities have opposite signs, the ¯rm with the lowest outgoing spillover is invest- ing most. However, with externalities that have the same sign, the asymmetry of spillovers determines who invests most. A beginning is made with the investigation of the robustness of the tendencies reported.Investments; Investment; Spillovers; Incentives; Competition; Market; Studies; Price setting; Sign; Robustness;

Variabel vergoeden.

Vele relaties en tansacties binnen een organisatie omvatten één of andere vorm van delegeren. Variabele vergoedingen kunnen hierbij de uitvoerder beter motiveren. Er bestaan hierbij tendensen tot het geven van zowel sterkere als zwakkere prikkels, alhoewel beloningen nooit lager mogen zijn dan wat elders kan verdiend worden. De redenen en gevolgen komen uitgebreid aan bod.